Performance measurement in the social sector has been dominated by the use of logic models based on assumptions of linearity and control. Little research exists on organizational performance in settings where causality is poorly understood. In this paper, we develop a contingency framework for measuring social performance, identifying the conditions under which some organizations should measure long-term impacts, while others should focus on shorter-term results. In building our framework, we draw on the extensive debates and methodological innovations on performance measurement that have emerged among social sector actors in the past two decades, both in the United States and in international development. In closing, we discuss the implications of our analysis for future research and for developing actionable knowledge on organizational performance.
Introduction
important challenge is one of aligning measurement with goals and strategy, especially the goals that an organization can reasonably control or influence. We contend that organizational efforts extending beyond this scope are a misallocation of scarce resources. In closing, we explore the implications of this work for further research on performance measurement in social sector organizations.
Measuring Organizational Performance
Much of the current writing on the performance of organizations is rooted in the vast literature on organizational effectiveness, which has long identified three basic types of indicators for judging organizational performance: outcomes, processes, and structures (Goodman and Pennings 1977; Scott 1977; Suchman 1967) . Outcomes are forward-looking measures in that they are the results predicted from a set of outputs (goods and services); processes are measures of effort which focus on inputs and activities carried out by organizations; and, structural indicators assess the capacity of an organization to perform work. Of these three types of indicators, Scott (1992: 354) notes that outcomes are often considered "the quintessential indicators of effectiveness, but they also may present serious problems of interpretation" such as inadequate knowledge of cause and effect, the time periods required to observe results, and environmental characteristics beyond the control of the organization such as market conditions or receptivity of external stakeholders. Others have added that the concepts of effectiveness and performance are inherently value laden and subjective (Cameron and Whetten 1983) .
More recent literature on organizational performance and effectiveness-in private, public, and nonprofit organizations-appears to converge on one key insight: there are rarely any singular and unambiguous measures of success in organizations. Even in for-profit firms, where it is tempting to assume that metrics are unambiguous because of the profit motive, this turns out not to be the case. Meyer (2002; 1994) identifies four broad types of measures common in profit-making businesses: valuation of the firm in capital markets; accounting measures; non-financial measures; and, cost measures. Not only is there no single measure that is adequate for measuring firm performance, but some measures can even point in opposite directions. For example, he draws on numerous studies to illustrate that key accounting measures (such as return on investment, return on assets, cash flows, and other measures of sales and profit) are rarely correlated with market measures (such as market value, return on equity, and change in share prices). It is not uncommon for a firm that fails to turn a profit to nonetheless see an uptick in its share price, or for a firm that makes considerable short-term profit to lose the confidence of long-term investors. In addition, forward-looking measures, such as market valuation, generally cannot be derived by rolling up other measures inside the organization. It turns out that most performance measures in which managers can have confidence are short-term and backward looking, as that is what can be most reliably measured. But such measures can be "noisy," and too much attention to them can lead to misguided searches for solutions to problems that don't exist in the long run (Greve 2003) . Moreover, non-financial metrics that focus on organizational processes and structures, rather than financial outcomes, have received increasing attention in firms over the past two decades, especially since the introduction of the balanced scorecard which provides a framework for strategy development guided by metrics along four dimensions: financial, customers, internal processes, and learning and growth (Kaplan 2001; Kaplan and Norton 1996) .
In short, firms tend to use multiple performance measures simultaneously. While some scholars are concerned that multiple performance goals can condemn managers to confusion (Jensen 2001) , others see it as an inevitable part of life in complex organizations, where the value of different measures rests in the fact that they don't correlate with one another. This is what Meyer (2002; 1994) has called the "performance paradox," for if the measures did correlate it would be possible to rely on a single roll up metric. The need to track multiple metrics, and to satisfy divergent criteria has fed the production of performance management frameworks such as scorecards and dashboards intended to assist managers in pursuing multiple performance goals simultaneously. Research by Ethiraj and Levinthal (2009) has suggested, however, that the constraints of bounded rationality make it difficult for people to deal with multiple goals at once, and that managers might be better off generating "goal myopia" -designing subsets of performance goals, carved out by organizational division or over defined periods of time.
These challenges of divergent criteria and multiple performance metrics are even more pronounced in nonprofit organizations, where ownership is generally less clear than it is in for-profit firms, thus leading to demands for accountability and reporting from multiple funders (such as foundations, government agencies, and individual donors), and varying expectations about performance from clients, communities, regulators, taxpayers, and their own staff and boards (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Kearns 1996; Lindenberg and Bryant 2001; Najam 1996) . Some scholars have suggested that there are as many types of accountability as there are distinct relationships among people and organizations (Lerner and Tetlock 1999) , characterizing the pronounced nature of this condition in nonprofit organizations as "multiple accountabilities disorder" (Koppell 2005) . The terrain of measurement can also be quite political and contested, particularly when measures are tied to the interests of funders or regulators but not necessarily to those of nonprofits or their clients (Stone and Cutcher-Gershenfeld 2001) . These multiple accountabilities create a difficult agency problem in nonprofits, with more powerful principals potentially pulling the organization in a direction misaligned with its mission or the interests of its clients, unless the organization has a means of prioritizing among competing demands.
Thus, a key gap in our understanding centers not only on the kinds of strategies used by managers to deal with multiple internal performance goals (Ethiraj and Levinthal 2009; Meyer 2002) , but also how to deal with competing accountability demands from external actors.
In terms of metrics, financial measures are generally treated by nonprofits as an input rather than an outcome (with microfinance being a notable exception), and they vary widely depending on industry (Anthony and Young 2004) . In education, for instance, performance is increasingly being measured in terms of student achievement in standardized tests in reading and math, although there is considerable debate over whether absolute levels of test performance, or performance improvement, is a better measure of effectiveness (Leana and Pil 2006) . In contrast, there is little convergence on how to measure performance in the field of arts and culture organizations, despite the frequent use of financial measures such as ticket revenue and net income (Voss et al. 2006) , on the basis that popular money-making productions serve a very different purpose than those that lose money but are designed to push cultural boundaries. Nonprofit ratings agencies that have traditionally relied on efficiency ratios (such as programto-administration expenses) for rating nonprofit performance are increasingly being questioned in terms of their helpfulness (Philanthropy Action 2009). A primary metrics challenge thus remains in establishing reliable and comparable non-financial measures. While there appears to be a growing convergence around the notion of "impact" as the ultimate non-financial measure of performance, as we elaborate below, there remains considerable ambiguity around how to operationalize it, and whether it helps or hinders nonprofit organizations in managing performance.
What most frameworks for measuring social performance share is the use of a "logic chain" or "logic model," sometimes referred to as program theory due to its origins in the evaluation of programs and projects (Bickman 1987; Rogers 2008; Weiss 1972) . We lay out our understanding of the key components of the basic logic model -inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts -in Figure 1 , which includes examples of the types of measures typically included under each step. The logic model emphasizes the measurement of performance as far down the chain as possible: outcomes and impacts that are long-term and which address the root causes of social problems. Through their adoption and dissemination by program evaluation specialists, logic models have emerged as a primary means through which nonprofits identify impacts and other performance metrics. Many funders such as philanthropic foundations and government agencies ask nonprofit grantees and contractors to use them.
As shown in the logic model, we use the term "impact" to refer to results at the furthest end of the logic chain. An established literature in international development and evaluation defines impacts as "significant or lasting changes in people's lives, brought about by a given action or series of actions" (Roche 1999: 21) . More recently, the term has also come to be associated with results that target the "root causes" of a social problem (Crutchfield and Grant 2008: 24) .
Variations of the logic model are widely used in two communities that we discuss next: U.S. nonprofit organizations in response to pressures from government and private foundations aiming to be more strategic about their philanthropy; and international development organizations such as bilateral government agencies and nongovernmental organizations seeking to improve development effectiveness. These two practitioner communities, which include influential think tanks, government agencies, and funding organizations, are at the epicenter of current debates and innovations in social performance. The academic literature in nonprofit studies, philanthropy, and management lags behind in providing theoretical and analytical insights to this burgeoning field. Because of the vastness and diversity of the social sector, we focus our discussion below on organizations working mostly in the field of poverty alleviation, including some illustrations from healthcare and education. This field is wide but well established, with an increasingly coherent set of debates on performance measurement.
We organize our inquiry around the following questions: What are the key drivers of efforts to measure social performance, and particularly impact? What are some of the methodological innovations emerging from the field? And what are some of the key gaps in our knowledge, especially in terms of building applied theory for social performance measurement? We then use this analysis for building a framework for measurement.
Drivers of Impact Measurement: Experience in the U.S. and in International Development
Impact measurement debates have taken center-stage in the world of U.S. private philanthropy, as foundations place renewed emphasis on measuring the impacts of their grantmaking and thinking more strategically about their giving (Frumkin 2006; Porter and Kramer 1999 The rise in strategic giving among foundations is not the only driver of the attention to impacts and outcomes. Over the past two decades, nonprofits have come under increasing governmental scrutiny to demonstrate impact and improve accountability to the public, particularly when they are involved in public sector contracting (Krauskopf and Chen 2010; Smith 1999; Smith and Lipsky 1993) . The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 led many state agencies to develop milestones and adopt performance-based contracts with service providers, including nonprofit agencies, as part of broader efforts to "reinvent government" (Behn 2001; Poister 2003: xv) . In a report to the U.S. Congress, motivated by concerns raised by the U.S. Senate Finance Committee in the wake of Sarbanes Oxley legislation, the independent Panel on the Nonprofit Sector recommended that every charitable organization should "provide more detailed information about its operations, including methods it uses to evaluate the outcomes of its programs, to the public through its annual report, website, and other means" Performance measurement has a considerably longer history in the field of international development, where it is generally divided into impact evaluation (IE), and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The former, as the nomenclature suggests, typically refers to the assessment of end results or impacts, while the latter is oriented towards informing mid-course correction by tracking the progress of a project or program. Since the 1950s, the international development field has seen various approaches to IE and M&E come in and out of fashion, with logic models and frameworks having become ubiquitous in the past 40 years (Roche 1999: 18-20 (Morgan and Qualman 1996; Roduner et al. 2008 ).
The spread of logic models and impact measurement cannot, however, be attributed to foundations and government agencies alone. In the mid-1990s in the United States, for example, a number of national-level nonprofit organizations, particularly industry support groups, began to advocate for outcome and impact measurement, while also developing tools for nonprofit managers. Among the most visible proponents was the United Way of America, which was one of the first national agencies to ask members of its network to distinguish between outputs and outcomes, supported by a series of resources designed to assist agencies in outcome measurement (United Way of America 1996) . Over the following decade, the Urban Institute and the Center for What Works developed a common outcome framework and a series of indicators for 14 categories of nonprofits, as well as a set of tools for assisting nonprofits with outcome management (Urban Institute and Center for What Works 2006). At about the same time, a broader set of performance management tools also gained traction among nonprofits, most notably the balanced scorecard, which was adjusted from its use in the business world to emphasize the missionrelated goals of nonprofits rather than financial targets (Kaplan 2001 ).
The evidence on whether outcome measurement has led to improved performance is mixed. A study of thirty leading U.S. nonprofits found that measurement was useful to the organizations for improving outcomes, particularly when they set measurable goals linked to mission (rather than trying to measure mission directly), kept measures simple and easy to communicate, and selected measures that created a culture of accountability and common purpose in the organization, thus helping to align the work of disparate units and chapters (Sawhill and Williamson 2001) . The United Way of America, in a survey of 391 partner agencies in 2000, reported that over three-quarters of respondents found outcome measurement useful for communicating results and identifying effective practices, as well as for helping to improve service delivery of programs. But the results were not all positive, with about half of the responding agencies reporting that implementing outcome measurement had led to a focus on measurable outcomes at the expense of other important results, an overloading of the organization's record-keeping capacity, and that there remained uncertainty about how to make program changes based on identified strengths and weaknesses (United Way of America 2000).
Foundations, too, have a mixed record of using impact assessments and evaluation in their decision making. In an analysis of evaluation methods used by philanthropic foundations from the early 1970s onwards, nonprofit historian Peter Dobkin Hall has argued that such evaluations lack rigor, and that key decision makers are often indifferent to the findings (Hall 2005: 33) approaches to evaluation in philanthropy points to a "shift from the use of evaluation to measure the impact of past grants and toward a more timely and pragmatic process of gathering forward-looking information that will enable both grantors and grantees to make ongoing improvements in their work" (Kramer et al. 2007: 5) . The report finds this tension to be fairly common in foundations, motivated on one hand by a need to identify the long-term outcomes and impacts of past projects, while also seeking more flexible and timely data to help with present performance. This tension is not unlike that in the business world between backward-looking accounting measures and forward-looking market measures.
A chorus of skeptical voices, particularly from practitioners, has suggested that while impact and outcome measurement appears to be "a good tool to help funders see what bang they're getting for their buck" it runs the risk of being counterproductive in the long run, both by drawing precious resources away from services and by putting too much emphasis on outcomes for which the causal links are unclear (Glasrud 2001: 35) , thus reflecting more of an obsession with institutional expectations of accountability to funders than an interest in actually finding ways of improving services and results (Torjman 1999: 5) .
Case studies of 36 nonprofits that used outcome measurement, conducted by the Independent Sector and the Urban Institute, noted that only about half of these organizations undertook some form of data analysis to help improve programs (Morley et al. 2001 ).
An important insight from the experiences of these practitioner communities is that performance measurement is a contested terrain: its tools and frameworks are adopted for multiple purposes, including to improve effectiveness, to garner resources in uncertain funding environments, and to satisfy accountability expectations of multiple principals. Moreover, the adoption of performance measurement practices does not necessarily improve impacts or decision making. We return to these drivers and insights following our discussion of innovations in measurement.
Methodological Innovations
Just in the past two decades, there have been numerous methodological advances with respect to measuring impact in the social sector. In the United States, a range of tools and approaches to capturing social value creation have emerged, such as the pioneering work on social return on investment carried out by REDF (formerly The Roberts Enterprise Development Fund), Acumen Fund's best available charitable option (BACO) methodology, Robin Hood Foundation's benefit-cost ratios, and several other related approaches (Kramer 2005; Tuan 2008 ). Each of these methods attempts to quantify social impact, with the aim of comparing and benchmarking different investments. Its primary users are funders or investors looking to allocate their resources for greatest social impact. These methodologies are influenced by concepts from the business world, particularly notions of expected return and cost effectiveness. They rely on numerous assumptions: what to measure, how to quantify the benefits and costs of an intervention, and how much of any impact can be attributed to the investment made by the funder. Table 1 lists some of these innovations (along with logic models and others discussed below). Table 1 about here
A key challenge in such quantification lies in addressing the thorny issue of causality: impacts are likely to be affected by multiple factors and actors, and attribution may be easier to establish in some interventions than in others. Such methods seem best suited to interventions where the relationship between cause and effect is linear and relatively well established, such as in the delivery of basic services of shelter, food, and job training, and more difficult in complex programs such as those targeting civil and human rights. Proponents of such quantification readily acknowledge these problems, arguing instead that it is the discipline of assessment that matters rather than the actual numbers, pressing one to clarify goals, to be explicit about assumptions, and to consider risks and limitations. They argue that all funders necessarily rank order potential grants or investments anyways, but that quantitative methodologies make the decision process more transparent and accountable, without which the basis for grant allocation "remains opaque and, therefore, largely beyond effective challenge" (Weinstein 2009: 23) . They also worry about the misuse of metrics, warning that a culture of measurement matters more than systems, and that information should not be confused with judgment (Trelstad 2008: 112-114 ).
In the world of international development, the past decade has also been a period of considerable innovation. Logic models are increasingly being coupled with experimental designs using randomized control trials (RCTs) for measuring performance and impact. A recent review of the evaluation literature in development agencies found that many agencies use the term impact evaluation to refer to evaluations involving a counterfactual -what would have happened in the absence of an intervention -and consider experimental designs using RCTs to be the "gold standard" for assessing impact ( At the same time, the rise of experimental approaches for IE has been challenged by a number of development practitioners and scholars who urge greater methodological pluralism, attention to institutional embeddedness, and a need for measurement models that address complex causalities. The nearly universal complaint about logic models and their derivative frameworks has been a reliance on linear cause-effect relationships that reduce complex anti-poverty work to mechanistic interventions, or which fail to account adequately for the political and institutional context of development interventions (Bakewell and Garbutt 2005; Ebrahim 2002 ). To be sure, advocates of pluralistic approaches to performance measurement maintain the importance of causal logics, contending that rigor in performance evaluation requires explicit linkages to theories of change Khagram et al. 2009 ).
But their views of appropriate measurement methodologies are contingent on context. They argue, for example, that randomized control trials may be well suited to activities such as the provision of vaccines, conditional cash transfers to the poor, or the distribution of new seed varieties to farmers, but less appropriate for activities where a comparison group is hard to isolate such as in policy advocacy, macroeconomic policy changes, reforms in labor markets, or even some investments in infrastructure Prowse 2007) . Nor are RCTs, they contend, suited to examining complex development pathways which involve multiple, interacting, and non-linear causal factors (Rogers 2009; , thus requiring multiple types of comparisons and triangulation.
The emerging approaches in this arena seek to marry methodological rigor with techniques suitable to contexts where the relationships between cause and effect are more difficult to identify, particularly where there are multiple and interacting causes and actors. A range of innovations have surfaced such as outcome mapping, constituency feedback, most significant changes techniques, and various participatory and adaptive learning approaches (see Table 1 ). For example, the methodology of outcome mapping typically brings together multiple actors -NGOs, policymakers, communities, and other change agents -for an interactive and iterative planning process aimed at changing institutional relationships that can facilitate better performance among all actors. As articulated by its developers at the International Development Research Centre in Canada, "the originality of the methodology is its shift away from assessing the development impact from a programme . . . towards a change in behaviours, relationships, networks, actions or activities of people, groups and organizations" (Earl et al. 2001: 2) .
Work by practitioners and scholars elsewhere has sought to develop frameworks that synthesize outcome mapping with the use of logic models (Roduner et al. 2008) or to introduce systems concepts to the design and conduct of evaluations and performance assessments (Fujita 2010; Ramalingam et al. 2008) . A primary contention of this set of approaches is that isolating causal factors and measuring impact is not enough, even in the limited circumstances when it is feasible; rather, policymakers and development managers need an integrated set of assessment methods that can help them build and adapt interventions in real time (Khagram et al. 2009 ). Some of this work is inspired by research on complex adaptive systems, where order is emergent rather than predetermined, and where the presence of many interacting agents makes the prediction of outcomes difficult (Dooley and Van de Ven 1999; Kauffman 1993 ).
In sum, there has been an explosion in methods for measuring social performance in recent years, some exemplars of which we have listed in Table 1 
Building Actionable Knowledge on Performance Measurement
Drawing on the experience of nonprofits working on poverty issues in the U.S. and internationally, three conceptual insights emerge from our discussion so far. First, performance measurement is a contested terrain in which the multiple accountability demands faced by managers create a complex agency problem. Performance measurement, and especially the emphasis on impact, can be seen a response to a classic accountability dilemma: controlling the behavior of agents (nonprofit organizations) who may have somewhat different interests or risk preferences than the principal (funder).
Where the behavior of agents is hard to observe, the principal has two basic options: to invest in information and governance systems to monitor and control the agent's behavior, or to arrange a contract with the agent that specifies key results, effectively transferring risk for outcomes to the agent (Eisenhardt 1989: 61; Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Impact measurement can thus be seen as a form of the latter option, outcome-based contracting. But addressing the problem of complex agency -multiple principals with divergent interests (Tucker 2010) , or various stakeholders who are unclear about their own criteria for assessing effectiveness (Herman and Renz 2008) -is less straightforward. We do not know enough about how nonprofit organizations handle this problem. Ideally, one might expect nonprofit managers to select only those sources of funding that are aligned with their missions (and thus their desired performance), but in resource-constrained environments nonprofits have been known to accept funding that risks goal displacement (Stone and Cutcher-Gershenfeld) or to employ buffering strategies in which they collect some data primarily for external consumption by funders, while filtering out performance data that are ambiguous or less aligned with funder interests (Hudock 1999; Opoku-Mensah et al. 2007 ).
Second, performance measurement is adopted not only for purposes of improving effectiveness (agency), but also to satisfy societal expectations about accountability (institutional legitimation).
Institutional theory points us to the social practices, myths, and norms that organizations incorporate to "increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of [their] immediate efficacy" (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 530-531) . Performance measurement practices can thus be seen as normative behaviors or scripts adopted for purposes of social legitimation, and diffused through the coercive demands of funders and regulators, imitation of organizations considered successful, and through their use by professionals such as evaluation specialists (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995) . For nonprofit organizations, the rewards from the external environment are potentially significant: tax-exempt status, government contracts for service-delivery, grants from foundations, and donations from individuals.
Such an interpretation stands in marked contrast to agency-based readings of performance measurement, suggesting that the tools and frameworks that nonprofits adopt are ceremonial scripts whose value lies in the external signals they send. Institutional arguments provide plausible explanations for the diffusion of many performance measurement practices used by the practitioner communities discussed above -logic models, performance-based contracts, balanced scorecards, outcome measurement. In practical terms, however, institutional theory points to the same gap raised by agency theory: how to cope with competing expectations from the external environment (i.e., the demands of multiple principals).
Third, the plethora of methods available for measuring social performance are not equally applicable to all types of social interventions, but appear to vary with the type of intervention These knowledge gaps all point to a need for applied frameworks that might help managers diagnose and prioritize among varying accountability demands, identify appropriate metrics, and select among measurement methodologies. Indeed, a key critique of the performance studies literature is that it has led to little usable knowledge and conceptual frameworks for informing management decision making (Meyer 2005) . For nonprofit managers, this dilemma comes to a head around a very practical question:
what to measure. Those that focus on measuring results at the front end of the logic chain (inputs and outputs) risk being seen as failing to be accountable to some of their principals, failing to convince funders and citizens that they are making a difference, thus risking both their support and their legitimacy.
But those that do try to demonstrate broader societal impacts risk overreaching by taking credit for social changes beyond their actual control, undermining their own agency and possibly overstretching their capacities and resources (Campbell 2002) .
How are nonprofit leaders to address this problem of "what to measure" when faced with an external environment that sends conflicting signals? We believe that part of the way forward lies in the development of performance measurement frameworks that endogenize the external environment, explicitly recognizing the degree of control (or lack of control) that a nonprofit exercises over its environment. The most widely used measurement framework today -the logic model -emphasizes an organization's outputs, outcomes and its impacts on society, but fails to account for how an organization's actions are shaped and constrained by its environment. Put another way, the basic logic model treats nonprofit organizations and interventions as closed rational systems rather than open ones subject to bounded rationality (Scott 1992; Simon 1957 ).
We begin to address this problem through a contingency framework for measuring social performance. Our aim in the framework is twofold. The first is conceptual: to embed performance measurement in relation to an organization's goals as well as its environment. The second is to generate actionable knowledge in answering our basic question "What should a nonprofit organization measure?"
A Contingency Framework For Measuring Results
In building a contingency framework for assessing what types of results to measure, we draw on recent advances in logic models, and particularly the work of Rogers (2008) who differentiates among interventions that are simple, complicated and complex (a distinction she credits to Glouberman and Zimmerman (2002) ). Most projects, programs, and organizations employ a simple logic model, which assumes a linear cause-effect relationship among variables as a basis for setting performance targets and for evaluating success. She suggests that such models are best suited to interventions that are tightly controlled, well understood and homogenous, and thus can effectively be treated as closed systems.
Complicated logic models are more useful for interventions that involve multiple agencies in implementation, multiple causal strands that must operate simultaneously in order to achieve success, or (Argyris and Schön 1974; Schön 1978, 1996) and has been in use in the social sector since the mid-1990s (Anderson 2004) . In explicitly articulating its theory of change, an organization lays out the linkages between its interventions (causes) and how it expects them to lead to desired results (effects).
How complex is the relationship between cause and effect, and how well is it understood? For a simple theory of change, the relationship between cause and effect is linear and clearly understood. A complex theory of change refers to cause-effect relationships that are only weakly understood, and where there may be multiple and non-linear causal factors at play.
For example, organizations engaged in the delivery of emergency and basic services, after a natural disaster such as an earthquake or hurricane, operate on a linear, or simple, theory of change: get shelter, food and water to people facing a crisis in order to avert further disaster. Or provide access to clean water and sanitation to improve human health. The logistics and supply chain management capabilities of doing so can be highly complicated, but the basic intervention logic is fairly straightforward. On the other hand, efforts by nonprofit actors to influence public policy are typically more complex, and they are shaped by many factors that may be poorly understood and non-linear (as we elaborate further below). In such contexts, it is hard to know how much of a difference a particular intervention makes. They may also involve disproportional impacts where small effects can be magnified through reinforcing loops or tipping points (Rogers 2008) , and involve constellations of many actors, making it difficult to attribute a policy change to the actions of any single organization.
--------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here --------------------------------
The horizontal axis of the matrix -operational strategy -refers to what an organization actually does in implementing an intervention or its mission. Under a simple operational strategy, the nonprofit concentrates on a highly specific task or intervention. For example, an ambulance service transports an individual to a hospital, the hospital provides treatment, and a family practice gives follow up care. Each organizational actor fills a specific and critical niche, and has contracts that establish responsibilities. But otherwise, the operations are fairly independent. Under a more complicated operational strategy, an organization expands its boundaries to absorb other key functions or niches that it deems important to achieving its mission, or it builds partnerships and networks with others actors that are critical to its mission. In the first instance, a hospital might acquire an ambulance service, a homeless shelter might provide in-house counseling and health care to its clients, or a job training program might create its own job placement pipeline with employers. In none of these examples is there a change in the organization's theory of change; it is simply expanding its operational strategy to exercise more control over that causal logic chain. An analogous process in the private sector is vertical integration in a supply chain. An organization expands its boundaries to absorb upstream or downstream functions or tasks, thus reducing uncertainties or risks associated with adjacent actors, or to take advantage of transaction cost efficiencies.
Taking into account these contingencies -i.e., the complexity of an organization's theory of change, and how complicated its operational strategy -we distinguish among four broad types of results: niche, integrated, institutional, and ecosystem (see Figure 2 ). These four types should not be read as a normative continuum, but instead as a reflection of the real circumstances faced by social sector actors. It is possible to be high-performing in each of the four quadrants.
Organizations in the niche quadrant are driven by a linear or well-understood causal logic (a simple theory of change) that they implement through very specific or well-defined interventions (a simple operational strategy). Many basic and emergency service providers such as homeless shelters and soup kitchens, for example, fulfill a critical function that is part of a longer chain of interventions for assisting homeless individuals. Their emergency work is focused on meeting immediate and highly tangible needs, and it is reasonable for them to measure their activities (the services they provide) and sometimes their outputs (immediate effects on clients). Any longer-term outcomes or impacts (getting people out of homelessness), however, are typically beyond the control and roles of such organizations.
Similarly, an ambulance service might measure its response time and the quality of its paramedic services (activities and outputs) but not the health of the patient after treatment at a hospital (outcomes). Crisis hotlines such as suicide or poison control call centers can offer support or information to callers on the phone, but they have little control over how, or even if, that information is used.
For such nonprofits, it is feasible to stick with simple measures of the organization's inputs, activities, and outputs. It would not make much sense to try to measure long-term impacts, since that is not what niche efforts can reasonably control, nor necessarily what the organization aims to achieve (Jacobs 2008 ). Yet they offer crucial services, attract considerable public donations, and may provide a basis for longer-term interventions.
The second quadrant refers to circumstances where it is possible to achieve integrated results.
Here, too, the theory of change is simple and typically includes organizations delivering basic services such as in health, sanitation, job training, and so on. But this work is different from niche contexts in that the organization occupies several niches in the causal chain, and thus has more control not only over outputs but also over outcomes. The Aravind Eye Hospital in India, for example, provides cataract eye surgeries. Its control over outcomes (restored vision) is made possible by the integration of many activities, ranging from the technology for cataract surgery and qualified medical staff, to extensive community outreach, setting up eye camps for the poor, transporting people, and providing follow up support. Aravind's theory of change is linear and straightforward, but its operational strategy is broad or complicated. Similarly, many nonprofits that provide job training programs offer not only training, but also placements with employers, plus follow-up support to clients.
These organizations are able to measure their outputs (numbers of patients seen and eye surgeries completed, or people trained and placed in jobs) and also outcomes (number of people with vision restored, or jobs retained for more than a year and increased incomes). Sometimes, the results can literally be "added up" to arrive at an aggregate measure of outputs and outcomes. Where organizations can isolate their interventions, they may be able to use quasi-experimental methods such as randomized control trials (RCTs) to test for effectiveness.
An even more complicated example of an integrated result is an immunization campaign, where the metrics are typically expressed as outputs (number or percentage of people vaccinated) and outcomes (declines in illness) in order to get at impacts (prevention, containment or eradication of a disease). While the causal logic in preventing or eradicating a disease may be relatively well established and linear, the operational strategy is extremely complicated -it requires not only having a proven vaccine and the technology for distribution, but also strategies for community organizing, for addressing cultural norms and fears that may limit immunization uptake, and for coordinating public health workers. Only one disease, smallpox, has ever been completely eradicated through an immunization campaign.
Similarly, NGOs engaged in humanitarian and disaster relief -such as the Red Cross or Doctors Without Borders -must be able to handle highly complicated logistics in getting relief supplies to a region hit by an earthquake, flood, or conflict. In order to deliver aid quickly, they must acquire and stock critical supplies such as blankets, tents, food and water, while also transporting, delivering, and distributing those supplies, and ensuring that they are delivered equitably and safely on the ground. Their challenges require a complicated operational strategy as well as extensive coordination with other actors such as governments, militaries, U.N. agencies, private sector suppliers, and other international and local NGOs. Their theories of change are focused or simple, while their operational strategies are complicated.
They can measure aggregate outputs (such as number of people receiving shelter, food, and clean water), and may be able to measure outcomes over a longer term (such as number of people with improved living conditions and health).
Organizations in the institutional quadrant focus their efforts on changing societal norms and regulative structures, such as those related to rights, gender equality, democratic freedoms, markets, and governance systems. Drawing on Scott (1995: 33) , we use the term institutional to signal the cultural and normative societal changes that organizations in this quadrant seek to achieve. However, for practical purposes, we limit our operational definition primarily to policy and advocacy organizations, including for example, Amnesty International and the American Association for Retired Persons. Such organizations benefit from having highly focused strategies, like organizations in the niche quadrant, but their theories of change are more complex -since changing societal norms and public policies is not as straightforward a process as delivering basic services. A nonprofit organization working on the rights of children, women, senior citizens, or workers in the informal economy may lobby legislators for years without seeing a change in public policy or regulation, but does that mean it has not influenced the policy discourse or societal attitudes? Or if there is a change in public attitudes about civil and human rights, how much of that change was a direct result of the efforts of that organization, as compared to media coverage, the predispositions of legislators, or other unanticipated factors? For actors in this quadrant, it may be feasible to measure their outputs and their "influence" in shaping key policies, rights, and freedoms (i.e., intermediate outcomes), but not necessarily their impacts. Ideally, one would like to measure outcomes such as legislation drafted or passed, but doing so would require an organization to isolate its role from that of other actors also trying to shape the legislation. The problem is that, while a nonprofit organization may influence or contribute to a policy or attitudinal change, it is more difficult to attribute that change solely to its interventions. Causality would be hard to establish, although correlation may be possible.
Arguably, impacts are more likely to be achieved by networks or coalitions of actors working in concert, than by single organizations acting alone. There has been a flurry of activity in recent years towards developing methods to help organizations identify interactive pathways and their effects in such complex and nonlinear contexts -for example, outcome mapping, most significant changes methodologies, and systems thinking (noted above). While these methods have received less attention than quasi-experimental methods, they show considerable promise for helping managers deal with the difficulties of measuring results in complex and "messy" environments.
Finally, organizations in the ecosystem quadrant aim for results that affect entire systems, both at the level of institutional norms and in terms of on-the-ground services to people. In other words, they are engaged in a range of problems that are not well understood (complex theory of change) while also playing in multiple niches (complicated operational strategy). For example, many international NGOs, such as Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, and ActionAid, originally provided basic services to poor communities in health, sanitation, education, and so on. Over the past two decades, however, they have expanded their strategies to include "rights-based" policy advocacy at national and global levels. They continue much of their service delivery work, but see it as part of a more complex set of interventions that includes building the rights of marginalized communities to make demands of their own governments.
Perhaps one of the most successful organizations operating at an ecosystem level is BRAC (formerly the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), one the world's largest non-governmental organizations.
With over 100,000 staff that claim to reach over 110 million people in parts of Asia and Africa, BRAC offers a comprehensive set of services in economic and social development, education, health, human rights, and legal services. The organization reaches most, if not all, villages in the regions where it works, effectively becoming a parastatal organization focused on poverty alleviation. A more modest example of this nature in the United States is the Harlem Children's Zone, which seeks to improve the life chances of urban youth by offering a "conveyor belt" of educational services covering over 100 city blocks in Harlem, while also engaging a range of actors such as city government, parents, and other nonprofits to create a caring environment for those youth. Both organizations are noteworthy not only because of the comprehensive nature of their work, but also because their integration across services and policy work enables them to better control the environment in which those interventions take place.
Each of these organizations aims for systemic changes that address the root causes of poverty.
Measuring these impacts, however, is likely to require long time frames: the Harlem Children's Zone expects to see impacts on its youth over the course of a generation, and BRAC monitors changes in rural communities over decades. Attributing those results to the work of any single organization is only possible where the organization has a near-monopoly on the interventions in that location. Indeed, BRAC has supplanted government services in many regions of Bangladesh, and the Harlem Children's Zone attempting to provide comprehensive services in a large section of New York City. For other organizations such as CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, and ActionAid, impacts are more likely to be achieved through partnerships and collaborations, although it may not be possible to attribute impacts solely to any one actor.
In sum, our contingency framework offers some preliminary propositions that relate performance measurement to the type of social sector activity:
1. Performance in emergency and relief work can be measured in terms of inputs, activities, and outputs.
2. Performance in service delivery work can be measured in terms of activities and outputs, and only sometimes in terms of outcomes and impacts.
3. Performance in advocacy and rights-based work can be measured in terms of outputs and "influence,"
an intermediary outcome.
Our contingency framework, and these propositions, lead to a number of further observations.
First, perhaps what is most surprising is that measuring impacts makes sense under a severely limited set of circumstances -for only some organizations in the integrated and ecosystem quadrants of our framework. With few exceptions, most organizations will not be able to exert sufficient control over their environments to attribute impacts solely to their work. Moreover, rights-based and advocacy interventions, despite aiming to address root causes of social problems, are more likely to be able to measure intermediate outcomes or "influence" on policy decisions, rather than impacts. These constraints also present a dilemma for accountability: funders increasingly want to see measures of impact, whereas it may not be feasible for many nonprofits to measure performance beyond outputs and outcomes.
Second, we expect that many organizations will not fit neatly into the quadrants of our matrix, with some traversing many of them. Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, and ActionAid for instance, are engaged in a portfolio of activities ranging from emergency relief to service delivery to rights-based work. They face the double-challenge of measuring performance in each of these areas separately, while also integrating across them in order to gauge their possible synergistic effects at the ecosystem level.
Third, funders such as foundations, governmental departments, and international aid agencies, are far better positioned than most nonprofits to measure impacts. A foundation that supports efforts in health care, for example, is uniquely situated to see how the work of all its grantees might link together -to connect the dots among a series of outputs and outcomes, to analyze how they lead to impacts. A central strategic challenge for funders is to articulate a logic for achieving impacts (a theory of change), and then to put together a portfolio of nonprofits to achieve those impacts (an operational strategy). While many funders ask their grantees to articulate a theory of change, few are explicit about their own or how it aligns with their operational strategy.
And finally, given the diversity of actors engaged in social change, the four broad types of results in the framework should be taken as suggestive rather than as silver bullets. The very basis of the framework -contingency -suggests that there are no panaceas to results measurement in complex social contexts. However, we believe that a key advance in this framework is that it reflects the open systems nature of social change rather than treating it as a closed rational system. Only in a limited set of circumstances are social sector organizations likely to have sufficient control over key variables in their environment to reasonably measure and take credit for impacts. At the same time, our model suggests that regardless of the quadrant -niche, integrated, institutional, or ecosystem -the development of performance metrics in any organization requires careful consideration of both its theory of change and its operational strategy. We anticipate that organizations that are unclear about their work on either of these dimensions will be confused about what they should be measuring.
Implications For Research
Our aims in this paper have been threefold: to provide a synthesis of key dilemmas and innovations in measuring social performance and impact; to point to key gaps in knowledge, particularly the lack of applied frameworks for guiding managerial decision making about accountability and performance; and to respond to this gap with a contingency framework for identifying what results to measure. The discussions around impact measurement, both within the U.S. and internationally, have been somewhat polarized -between those who demand clear and quantifiable measures of impact and those who contend that social sector work is so unique and context-specific that it cannot be readily measured. Our contingency framework attempts to move beyond such reductionism by differentiating among types of results and offering a logic for deciding what to measure. Moreover, this work advances previous research on the logic model by separating its causal and operational dimensions, while treating nonprofit interventions as occurring in open rather than closed systems. But while our framework responds to a key critique of the organizational performance measurement literature -a dearth of actionable frameworks for guiding management decision making -we believe this gap remains large, and that theory continues to lag behind innovations in the field.
This work has numerous implications for future research on performance and accountability in social sector organizations. First, there is a need for research to examine how nonprofit leaders handle the competing accountability demands of different stakeholders and funders, and the role of measurement in doing so. Our contingency framework is intended to offer a strategic basis for organizational leaders and managers to clarify what types of results they seek to achieve, and thus for what they should be held to account. But we recognize that this is easier said than done, as there is a tendency in the nonprofit sector to frame performance measurement simply as a problem of "compliance" with the demands of funders or regulators, rather than as a critical component of strategy. Our contingency framework shows how metrics can serve as a means of aligning an organization's theory of change with its operational strategy.
Research can shed light on how managers navigate these multiple and competing demands, the struggles they face in creating alignment, how they carve out separate performance goals across divisions, and the leadership and governance capacities they need.
Second, research can help us to better understand and evaluate the plethora of methodologies and tools for assessing social performance and impact that have emerged over the past two decades, some exemplars of which we have listed in Table 1 Nonprofit organizations rely on various processes, such as consensus and consultation, to build credibility and legitimacy with their funders, the communities they serve, and internally among their staff and boards. How do they contest, resist, revise, and innovate with performance measurement practices in order to respond to institutional pressures and yet stay true to their missions and goals? How do nonprofits negotiate their performance measures, both to build internal and external legitimacy? Process theories, such as structuration, may be more helpful in exploring this line of inquiry than strictly agency or institutional perspectives (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Giddens 1984; Jarzabkowski 2008) .
Finally, there is a critical need to develop performance measurement approaches that differentiate between closed and open systems. Managing performance in a closed system requires nonprofit managers to identify key cause and effect relationships, and then to strategically target their interventions to increase control over critical causal variables. As such, performance measurement entails judgments about what an organization can and cannot control. Managing performance in an open system requires a greater tolerance for uncertainty and a willingness to take risks, to innovate, to expect failure, and to engage in mid-course adaptation. This challenge is especially difficult in contexts where causal logics are nonlinear, irrational, or subject to so many possible influences that no single organization can solve a social problem by acting alone. For organizations intervening at the ecosystem level in our contingency model, managing performance is particularly daunting-and poorly understood-because their work tends to be causally complex and operationally complicated. Many international NGOs operate at this level, engaging in a range of interventions from social services to policy advocacy, on the basis that one must intervene across the entire ecosystem in order to have a lasting effect on poverty.
We know little about how to assess performance in such contexts, much less how to build systems to support it. Asking organizations to identify the impacts for which they alone can claim credit, seems to be the wrong question to ask. Rarely do such organizations act alone, relying instead on extensive networks of partner organizations and community groups. We believe the more important questions are: How does one assess performance when there are multiple actors involved? How can performance and learning systems be designed to encourage collaboration, rather than competition, in solving complex societal problems?
In closing, we wish to emphasize the need for more applied research on performance in the social sector that can lead to actionable knowledge for managers. Performance measurement occurs in an environment that is socially constituted and populated by multiple principals and expectations for accountability. It is unlikely that managers will find singular or unambiguous measures of performance.
They are instead likely to have to choose among a plethora of metrics, methods, and processes. The core challenge, as we see it, is a duality: to develop performance measurement approaches that focus managerial attention on their goals and missions, while also helping them to situate their work within a larger ecosystem of actors. In the end, societal problems are unlikely to be solved by organizations acting and measuring alone. • Assesses the impact of an intervention, and measures the size of that impact, by comparing outcomes in groups that receive an intervention to those that do not.
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